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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tia Jo Satcher appeals from her judgment of conviction for grand theft. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Danelle Ostolasa-Mendiola went shopping at Walmart on Christmas Eve 
at about 11:30 a.m. (Trial Tr., p. 176, L. 8- p. 177, L. 13; p. 178, Ls. 3-19.) After 
completing her shopping she put her purse in the shopping cart and went to her 
car and unloaded the cart. (Trial Tr., p. 177, L. 14 - p. 180, L. 19.) She did not 
have a view of the cart at all times when she unloaded. (Trial Tr., p. 180, Ls. 20-
25.) Once done unloading she saw that the cart was empty, including not having 
her purse in it, and assumed she had put her purse in the car. (Trial Tr., p. 181, 
Ls. 1-20.) In fact, she did not have her purse. (Trial Tr., p. 181, L. 21 - p. 182, L. 
8.) 
At 12:34, shortly after the purse went missing, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's 
credit card was used at a Flying J gas station adjacent to the Walmart. (Trial Tr., 
p. 182, L. 13 - p. 185, L. 2; p. 190 Ls. 12-23; p. 210, Ls. 5-10.) Video from the 
Flying J shows Satcher in a van, with the male driver of the van buying gas at 
that time. (Trial Tr., p. 307, L. 2 - p. 311, L. 22; State's Exhibit 2.) 
The police began following Satcher at the Towne Square Mall on an 
unrelated matter about one and one-half hours after Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's 
credit card had been used at the convenience store. (Trial Tr., p. 221, L. 24 - p. 
225, L. 24.) The police followed the van in which Satcher was a passenger as it 
went across the street from the mall to the parking lot of the Toys-R-Us and then 
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onto Westpark, south on Milwaukee, east on Franklin, south on Cole, west on 
Overland, and into the parking lot of the Walmart. (Trial Tr., p. 225, L. 25 - p. 
227, L. 24.) The police made contact with Satcher and the male driver, Robert 
Minor, in the Walmart parking lot. (Trial Tr., p. 228, L. 2 - p. 231, L. 11.) Satcher 
was on her cell phone at that time. (Trial Tr., p. 230, L. 25 - p. 231, L. 6.) The 
van's gas gauge was full. (Trial Tr., p. 234, Ls. 1-20.) 
At around 2:30, about three hours after the purse went missing, Ms. 
Ostolasa-Mendiola received a call from Satcher, who stated she had found the 
purse in the trash dumpsters at Walmart. (Trial Tr., p. 186, L. 2-p. 187, L 9.) 
Satcher, however, said she could not talk at that time because she was being 
pulled over by the police. (Trial Tr., p. 187, Ls. 10-13.) After confirming to Ms. 
Ostolasa-Mendiola that the purse contained a driver's license and credit cards 
Satcher hung up. (Trial Tr., p. 187, L. 14 - p. 188, L. 8.) When the police made 
contact with her, Satcher's first statement was that she was returning the purse, 
which was the first the police knew about any issue involving a purse. (Trial Tr., 
p. 232, Ls. 3-13.) A couple of minutes after talking with Satcher, Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola received a call from the police stating that they had her purse. (Trial 
Tr., p. 188, Ls. 9-12; p. 192, Ls. 15-24.) 
When contacted by a detective at the police station, before being 
questioned or confronted with any evidence, Satcher denied having used 
Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card. (Trial Tr., p. 300, Ls. 14-24.) During the 
interview she stated that she had discovered the purse in a shopping cart at 
Walmart between 11 :50 and 12:30. (Trial Tr., p. 302, Ls. 5-13; p. 304, Ls. 7-10.) 
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Satcher denied having used the credit card while it was in her possession but did 
not deny that her male companion used it, and acknowledged that the credit card 
had been used to buy gas for the van at the Flying J. (Trial Tr., p. 304, L. 11 - p. 
305, L. 18.) 
The state charged Satcher with grand theft of lost property. (R., pp. 33-
34, 119-20.) The jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p. 153.) Satcher filed a 
timelynoticeofappealfromthejudgment. (R., pp.157, 161.) 
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ISSUES 
Satcher states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there insufficient evidence in this case to support the 
State's allegation of grand theft of lost property in the form of 
a financial transaction card? 
2. Did the district court err when it permitted the State, over Ms. 
Satcher's objection, to elicit testimony from a police officer 
as to his opinion of whether Ms. Satcher's denial of guilt was 
truthful? 
3. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he intentionally 
elicited testimony from one witness regarding his opinion of 
Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying guilt of the charged 
offense? 
4. Did the district court err when it admitted evidence in the 
form of a restitution order under the auspices of I.R.E. 609 
where the restitution order was not a criminal conviction and 
was not admitted for any purpose related to Ms. Satcher's 
credibility? 
5. Does the cumulative error doctrine require reversal in this 
case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.) The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The evidence showed that Satcher had possession of the purse for over 
two hours; that a credit card in the purse was used by Satcher's 
companion to buy gas; and that Satcher contacted the victim only while 
literally in the act of being contacted by the police. Has Satcher failed to 
show that a rational jury could not conclude that Satcher did not take 
reasonable measures to return the purse and its contents to the owner? 
2. Has Satcher failed to show reversible error in the admission of opinion 
testimony about whether Satcher's statements to police were truthful 
because any such error was harmless? 
3. Has Satcher failed to show reversible error in the admission of evidence 
that she owed restitution jointly with Robert Minor in association with a 
prior felony conviction because such error was harmless? 
4. Has Satcher failed to show cumulative error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Satcher's Claim That The Evidence Is Insufficient To Show That She Did Not 
Take Reasonable Measures To Return The Purse And Its Contents To The 
Owner Is Meritless 
A. Introduction 
Satcher contends the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the 
evidence is that she took reasonable measures to return the stolen property and 
that she did not withhold the purse or its contents from Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola 
with intent to deprive her of her property. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-20.) This 
argument is meritless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,826 P.2d 919 (Ct App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
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from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict Miller, 
131 ldahoat292, 955 P.2d at607; Hart, 112 ldahoat761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
C. Satcher's Argument That The Evidence Is Insufficient Is Frivolous 
To prove theft of stolen property the state had to prove that Satcher 
intended either to deprive the victim of her property or to appropriate the same to 
herself or another. I.C. § 18-2403(1 ). The state also had to prove that Satcher 
did not take reasonable measures to return the property to its owner. I.C. § 18-
2403(2)(c). The evidence established that Satcher had Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's 
purse and its contents for over two hours; her boyfriend used a credit card from 
the purse to buy gas shortly after Satcher acquired possession of the purse; and 
Satcher contacted the victim only after the police had followed her vehicle for 
about 15 minutes and were in the act of detaining her. The evidence presented 
supports the inference that Satcher both intended to deprive Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola of the purse and its contents and did not take reasonable measures to 
return the purse and its contents to its owner. Indeed, it is hard to draw any 
conclusion other than that Satcher and her boyfriend intended to use Ms. 
Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit cards and only changed their minds upon being 
caught. Satcher's argument, which relies upon an assumption that the jury 
believed her testimony as long as it "was not directly contradicted" and ignores 
most of the other evidence (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-20), is legally and factually 
frivolous. 
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11. 
Satcher Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The Admission Of Opinion 
Testimony About Whether Satcher's Statements To Police Were Truthful 
Because Any Such Error Was Harmless 
A Introduction 
The prosecution asked Detective Kendall if, based on his training and 
experience, he believed Satcher had been truthful in his interview of her. (Trial 
Tr., p. 320, Ls. 5-7; p. 321, Ls. 15-25.) Satcher objected to the question. (Trial 
Tr., p. 320, Ls. 8-11; p. 321, Ls. 1-5; p. 322, Ls. 1-14.) The court ultimately 
allowed the prosecution to ask the detective's opinion on Satcher's truthfulness 
during the interview, and the detective testified he "did not feel she was being 
truthful." (Trial Tr., p. 322, L. 23 - p. 323, L. 15.) 
On appeal Satcher asserts that the district court erred in admitting 
evidence of Detective Kendall's opinion as to Satcher's truthfulness. 1 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-26.) The state concedes that the evidence was 
inadmissible. State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 468-69, 163 P.3d 1175, 
1180-81 (2007) (opinion testimony on truthfulness of other witnesses is 
inadmissible). However, the error was harmless and Satcher's trial was fair. 
1 Satcher also argues that it was prosecutorial misconduct to ask the detective his 
opinion as to Satcher's truthfulness in the interview. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-
31.) The state does not concede any claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
Although it is prosecutorial misconduct to ask questions seeking inadmissible 
evidence as a way of circumventing either the rules of evidence or judicial 
rulings, State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 
(2007) (citing State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903)), here the 
district court ruled the evidence admissible. Thus, the state submits, it is judicial 
error, not prosecutorial misconduct, at issue here. 
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B. Standard Of Review For Harmless Error 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a). 
See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even 
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the 
burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 
974 (2010). 
C. Admission Of Detective Kendall's Opinion That Satcher Was Not Truthful 
In The Interview Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
"[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect 
one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). In reviewing for 
harmless error the court evaluates the potential prejudice from the inadmissible 
evidence in the context of the evidence presented at trial. See State v. Yager, 
139 Idaho 680, 687, 85 P.3d 656, 663 (2004) (error in failing to suppress 
evidence harmless because probative value of evidence improperly admitted at 
trial was de minimus in light of evidence presented). Review of the record shows 
that admission of Detective Kendall's opinion that Satcher was untruthful in the 
interview did not deny Satcher a fair trial because the potential prejudice of the 
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improper opinion testimony was minimal in light of the evidence presented at 
trial. Beyond a reasonable doubt a rational jury would have convicted Satcher 
even without admission of that evidence. 
Evidence of opinion testimony that a witness is not truthful is "an invasion 
of the province of the jury, who are the judges of the credibility of witnesses." 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,468, 163 P.3d 1175, 1180 (2007) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). "Generally, expert testimony that purports to 
determine whether a particular witness is truthful on a particular occasion is not 
permitted because there is no reason to believe that experts are any more 
qualified to render such opinions than are jurors." kl (quotations and citations 
omitted). Thus, the potential prejudice here is that the jurors deferred to 
Detective Kendall's determination of truthfulness, and thereby reached a 
determination on truthfulness they would not have reached without the 
inadmissible opinion testimony, and thus reached a different verdict. 
That this potential prejudice did not result in a different verdict than would 
have been reached without admission of the evidence is shown by three factors. 
First, the jury already knew or would have surmised that Detective Kendall did 
not believe Satcher's exculpatory version of events without the challenged 
evidence. Second, the jury instructions minimized the potential for prejudice by 
minimizing the chance that the jurors simply deferred to Detective Kendall's 
opinion instead of forming their own opinions as to the truthfulness of Satcher's 
statements in the interview. Finally, the evidence at trial overwhelmingly 
demonstrated that Satcher's statements in the interview were not truthful. These 
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three factors, individually and cumulatively, show that the error did not affect the 
outcome of the trial. 
First, Detective Kendall's testimony that, in his opinion, Satcher was 
untruthful in the interview was not information unknown to the jury even without 
the inadmissible testimony. In the interview Satcher provided a generally 
exculpatory account of her behavior in relation to the purse, claiming a desire to 
get it back to its owner and ignorance that her boyfriend had used the credit card. 
(State's Exhibit 1; see also Trial Tr., p. 300, Ls. 14-24; p. 302, Ls. 5-13; p. 304, L. 
7 - p. 306, L. 15; p. 311, L. 23 - p. 312, L. 5.) The fact that Satcher was charged 
and the detective was a witness against her would have informed any rational 
jury that the detective did not accept her exculpatory version of events as truthful. 
(See Trial Tr., p. 325, Ls. 10-14 (detective told Satcher that he would decide 
"what course the criminal proceedings would take"); p. 328, Ls. 4-8). They also 
heard evidence that Detective Kendall had repeatedly told Satcher in the course 
of the interview that he did not believe her. (State's Exhibit 1; Trial Tr., p. 325, 
Ls. 2-9; p. 327, Ls. 21-24.) The evidence at trial clearly established that 
Detective Kendall did not believe Satcher's exculpatory version of events; it was 
therefore unlikely that the inadmissible testimony in any way persuaded the jury 
to reach a conclusion it would not have reached without the testimony. 
Second, the jury instructions minimized any potential for prejudice. The 
jury was instructed that it was not required to accept all the evidence that was 
admitted (Trial Tr., p. 463, Ls. 20-21 ); that it must make its own evaluation of the 
evidence and assign it what weight it believed the evidence deserved (Trial Tr., 
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p. 463, Ls. 21-25); that the jurors should consider their own experiences in 
evaluating credibility (Trial Tr., p. 464, Ls. 8-15); what factors jurors might 
consider in evaluating testimony (Trial Tr., p. 464, L. 16 - p. 465, L. 1 0); and that 
the jurors were not bound by any expert opinions (Trial Tr., p. 465, Ls. 11-17). 
The instructions thus made it clear that the jury was not bound by the detective's 
opinion, and that it was free to make its own determination of Satcher's 
truthfulness. 
Finally, the evidence of Satcher's untruthfulness was overwhelming. 
Satcher would have had the jury believe that she discovered the purse while 
looking for her missing wallet (Trial Tr., p. 408, L. 13 - p. 410, L. 4; p. 433, L. 9 -
p. 434, L. 18), but once she found the purse she abandoned the search for her 
own wallet, went shopping elsewhere for two hours, then returned to Walmart to 
resume the search for her wallet (Trial Tr., p. 453, L. 7 - p. 454, L. 11). She 
would have the jury believe that she declined to place the purse in the store lost 
and found because it was not secured (Trial Tr., p. 410, L. 20- p. 411, L. 12; p. 
440, L. 9 - p. 442, L. 18), but then kept it with her or in the van her boyfriend was 
using for more than two hours before finally making contact with the victim. She 
would have the jurors believe that after confirming that someone was likely 
available for a phone call at the purse owner's house (due to a busy signal) (Trial 
Tr., p. 411, L. 12 - p. 413, L. 9; p. 443, Ls. 2-8), she did not make another call for 
about two hours despite a desire to return the purse (Trial Tr., p. 418, L. 24 - p. 
419, L. 13; p. 443, L. 9 - p. 447, L. 20). The call in which she did make contact 
with the victim happened to coincide with Satcher being contacted by the police. 
11 
(Trial Tr., p. 420, L. 16- p. 421, L. 3; p. 454, Ls. 12-14.) Finally, she would have 
the jury believe that her boyfriend, while the purse was placed on the floor of the 
van between the seats he and Satcher were sitting in, got into the purse that was 
unfamiliar to him, accessed the wallet that he was, again, unfamiliar with, 
removed the credit card that he did not know was there, purchased gas with the 
credit card, returned the credit card, and zipped the purse compartment where 
the wallet was, all without her knowledge because her dog had strategically 
positioned itself to prevent her from seeing any of this. (Trial Tr., p. 182, L. 13 -
p. 183, L. 18; p. 416, L. 22 - p. 418, L. 5; p. 419, Ls. 15-19; p. 449, L. 9 - p. 452, 
L. 3.) 
In addition, Satcher's version of events conflicted with other evidence. 
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified she had an answering machine that had no 
messages on the day in question (Trial Tr., p. 185, L. 20 - p. 186, L. 1), but 
Satcher claimed that the victim's phone simply rang without any response when 
she first tried to call (Trial Tr., p. 412, Ls. 19-24; p. 445, Ls. 7-10). Ms. Ostolasa-
Mendiola testified that Satcher told her she had found the purse in a trash 
dumpster at Walmart (Trial Tr., p. 187, Ls. 1-9; p. 190, Ls. 4-6), but Satcher 
testified she found the purse in a shopping cart about 75 yards from a recycle bin 
at the Flying J. (Trial Tr., p. 430, L. 20 - p. 431, L. 16). Satcher had been 
convicted of two felonies, including one forgery. (Trial Tr., p. 404, L. 17 - p. 405, 
L. 2.) In addition, Satcher was quick to tell the police that she was trying to return 
the purse before police even knew a purse was missing (Trial Tr., p. 232, Ls. 3-
12 
13) and she denied using the credit card at a time when she claimed she did not 
know the credit card had been used (Trial Tr., p. 300, Ls. 14-24). 
The record before this Court shows that a rational jury would, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, have convicted Satcher even without the admission of the 
challenged evidence. Although Detective Kendall's testimony that in his opinion 
Satcher was untruthful in the interview was not admissible, there is no basis for 
believing that the jury abandoned its role as arbiters of credibility or that the jury 
would have reached a different verdict in the absence of the opinion. The error 
was harmless. 
111. 
Satcher Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The Admission Of Evidence 
That She Owed Restitution Jointly With Robert Minor In Association With Her 
Felony Conviction Because Such Error Was Harmless 
A. Introduction 
The district court ruled that Satcher could be impeached with evidence 
that she had a prior felony forgery conviction in 2004 and a felony conviction in 
2009 (but that the nature of the conviction, grand theft, was inadmissible). (Trial 
Tr., p. 358, Ls. 19-23; p. 367, Ls. 9-15; p. 373, Ls. 10-21.) The court also ruled, 
over objection, that to the extent the defense claimed that Robert Minor operated 
alone when he used the victim's credit card, the state could impeach that 
evidence with evidence that the restitution order regarding the 2009 felony was 
joint and several between Satchel and Minor. (Trial Tr., p. 367, L. 5 - p. 369, L. 
13; p. 373, L 10 - p. 374, L. 14.) During direct examination Satcher testified that 
she had been convicted of forgery in 2004 and a felony in 2009. (Trial Tr., p. 
13 
404, L. 17 - p. 405, L. 2.) The evidence presented to the jury regarding the 
restitution order was, in its entirety, the following two questions and answers: 
Q. The matter for which you're on probation in Canyon 
County, in 2009, is there an order of restitution in that case? 
A. Yes there is. 
Q. And does that or - order of restitution include a 
person named Robert Minor? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(Trial Tr., p. 405, Ls. 3-9.) 
Satcher claims that the district court erred by admitting evidence of the 
restitution related to the prior felony conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 32-38.) 
The state concedes that evidence that there was a restitution order related to a 
prior unidentified felony that "include[d] a person named Robert Minor" was 
irrelevant.2 I.RE. 402. The error, however, was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review For Harmless Error 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.RE. 103(a). 
See also I.C.R 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is whether, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even 
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 
2 The state's concession is limited to relevance; as set forth more fully below, the 
state does not concede that the evidence actually admitted was unfairly 
prejudicial. 
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664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the 
burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 
974 (2010). 
C. Any Error From Admission Of Evidence That The Restitution Order In The 
Prior Undesignated Felony Included Robert Minor Was Harmless 
Evidence that Satcher's 2009 unspecified felony conviction resulted in a 
restitution order that "include[d] a person named Robert Minor," while irrelevant, 
was not unfairly prejudicial. Satchel argues that the evidence was prejudicial 
because "the jury would infer the defendant's criminal propensity from that 
evidence." (Appellant's brief, p. 35.) This argument is illogical. Satcher does 
not claim that evidence that she was convicted of a felony was inadmissible; that 
the felony conviction also resulted in a restitution order does not somehow 
unfairly call attention to criminal propensity. 
On the face of the record, the jury was very briefly informed that the 2009 
conviction for an unspecified felony also resulted in a restitution order that 
included Robert Minor. Satchel has failed to articulate a plausible reason to 
believe that this evidence in fact unfairly prejudiced her at trial. Given the weight 
and volume of the evidence of her guilt, as set forth in more detail above, this 
passing, irrelevant, reference to restitution was harmless error. 
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IV. 
Satcher Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, 
each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show 
the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right 
to due process." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,965 P.2d 174 (1998) (internal 
quotation omitted); see also State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, _, 254 P.3d 77, 
95 (Ct. App. 2011 ). "The presence of errors alone, however, does not require the 
reversal of a conviction." State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169, 
1180 (Ct. App. 2010). "[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair 
trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). 
Although the state's concessions that there were two errors in the trial 
makes the cumulative error analysis applicable, review shows that Satcher 
received a fair, if imperfect, trial. First, the two errors would not result in 
prejudice that would have cumulative effect. That the jury was informed there 
was a restitution order that involved Minor did not bolster Detective Kendall's 
opinion that Satchel was untruthful in the interview and vice-versa. Second, as 
shown above, in the context of the whole trial, including the overwhelming 
evidence of guilt, the inadmissible evidence did not call into question the fairness 
of the trial. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 2011. 
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